We examine firms from 16 countries spanning 2000-2013 and find that only 25% of firms exhibit sticky dividends, while the majority either increase (54%) or decrease (21%) their annual dividends. This high variability in dividend payments increases investor demand for dividend information. Accordingly, analysts respond to this demand by producing informative dividend forecasts. Analysts' dividend estimates are useful to investors because they (i) are more accurate and better aligned with market dividend expectations than standard time-series modelling approaches, (ii) convey incremental information beyond that contained in other fundamentals, and (iii) help investors interpret the persistence of earnings news. *Pawel Bilinski is from Cass Business School, City University London. Mark Bradshaw is from Boston College.
conclusion that firms infrequently change their dividends has framed academic thinking for over half a century (Fama and French (2001) ). For example, Hoberg and Prabhala (2009, p. 79) argue that 'the disappearing dividends phenomenon is a striking empirical regularity that demands explanation. ' Baker et al. (2012) survey Canadian firms on why they do not pay dividends, building on the evidence in Denis and Osobov (2008) that the proportion of Canadian dividend-paying firms declined from 74.3% in 1988 to 19.9% in 2001. Contrary to the prevailing assumption that dividends are declining in importance or are sufficiently sticky that extrapolative expectations are sufficient, the frequency and magnitude of dividends is increasing, especially non-US firms. For example, Floyd et al. (2014) report that 59.1% of US dividend payers increased their annual dividend over the period 2000 -2012 . Further, in 2012 , a record 81% of S&P 500 firms paid dividends and 68% increased their dividends over the prior year (Factset Dividend Quarterly (2013) ). Similarly, Vieira (2011) reports that 66% of French firms and 81% of UK firms increased dividends each year over the period [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] . Dividend reductions are also evident, especially around the recent financial crisis.
1 In this study, we argue that the increasing importance of and variability in dividend payments reduces investor reliance on simple extrapolative dividend estimates and increases investor demand for explicit dividend
forecasts. This prediction contrasts with the 'sticky' dividends view.
Investors demand dividend information because future dividends bear directly on expected portfolio returns. For some long-term investors, like public and corporate pension funds, dividend paying stocks are preferred because these investors are either fully or largely exempt from dividend income taxes (Allen et al. (2000) , Del Guercio (1996) , Gompers and Metrick (2001) ). 2 For example, Dimson et al. (2008) find that the dividend yield accounted for 90% of the real return from global equities over the period . Further, standard option pricing reveals that dividend estimates are crucial for derivative traders because dividends affect settlement prices. Dividend estimates are essential for brokers' securities lending desks as the 1 In addition to firms altering their dividend payouts, an increasing number of firms initiate dividend payments. For example, Floyd et al. (2014) report that the proportion of dividend payers among US industrial firms almost doubles between 2001 and 2011.
2 Harris et al. (2015) highlight an increasing investor demand for dividend income. They report that some mutual funds are willing to pay a premium to purchase stocks before dividend payments to artificially increase their dividends and that investors reward these funds with higher net inflows. Consistent with the increasing importance of dividends in the US, The Wall Street Journal reports that net inflows into mutual funds and exchange-traded funds focused on dividend paying stocks amounted to $9 billion in 2012. Over the same period, there was a net outflow of $7.3 billion for all other US stock funds (The Wall Street Journal, April 7, 2012) .
rebate rates for lending shares, which reflect the commission for lending shares, includes a fee for foregone dividend payments. This relation reflects the intensity of dividend arbitrage-a practice where investors subject to withholding taxes on dividends lend shares to tax-exempt investors to reduce their own tax burden. Around $100 billion in European shares, close to 75% of all European equity lending, are lent as part of dividend arbitrage (Mathiason (2011) ).
Because of the importance of dividends, we expect significant investor demand for analyst dividend forecasts if these forecasts are more useful to investors than alternate sources of such expectations. Moreover, given the integral nature of dividends in the evaluation of earnings persistence and firm valuation, accurate dividend expectations should be informative to investors beyond their stand-alone expectations value. In this study, we examine (i) the frequency with which analysts forecast dividends for a large set of global firms, (ii) the accuracy of analyst dividend forecasts relative to standard time-series estimates, (iii) whether investors rely on analyst dividend forecasts (rather than alternative time-series estimates) when forming expectations of future dividends, (iv) whether dividend forecasts convey new information to the market, and (v) whether investors use dividend forecasts to interpret persistence of earnings news.
To examine how analysts respond to investor demand for dividend forecasts, we collect a sample of I/B/E/S dividend estimates over the fiscal years 2000-2013 for the US, twelve
European countries, Australia, and two Asian countries. We document that, on average, analysts provide dividend forecasts for 87.9% of all dividend-issuing firms, with an average of 14 dividend forecasts per firm-year. Interestingly, for US firms, dividend forecasts on I/B/E/S are largely unavailable before 2001, but the proportion of dividend payers with at least one dividend forecast in a fiscal year increases from 3% in 2001 to 96% in 2013. 3 The proportion of dividend forecasts for European and Australasian dividend payers increases from, respectively, 81% and 44% in 2000 to 89% and 84% in 2013. The upward trend in availability of dividend estimates provides de facto evidence of a significant investor demand for analyst dividend estimates. 3 The evidence for an increasing availability of dividend forecasts for US firms confirms the prediction that analysts produce dividend forecasts in response to investor demand for these forecasts, confirmed through our discussions with the I/B/E/S support team. Further, Julio and Ikenberry (2004) , Floyd et al. (2014) and Factset Dividend Quarterly (2013) highlight that the increasing trend in the number of dividend payers in the US started in 2001. Finally, the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA 2003) reduced the tax rate on dividends to 15%, increasing the advantage of dividends over share repurchases as a way of distribution excess cash to shareholders (Chetty and Saez (2005) , Brown et al. (2007 ), Brav et al. (2008 ).
To examine our predictions for why investors demand analyst dividend estimates, the first part of the study documents the variability of dividend policies across our sample countries. We document that on, average, 54% of firms in our sample increase their annual dividend compared to the previous year, 21% reduce the dividend and only 25% maintain the dividend compared to the previous year. The dividend payout ratio increases for 49% of firms and remains constant in only 9% of cases. In the US, 62% of firms increased and 11% reduced their dividend compared to the previous year during our sample period. As analysts may be better at predicting changes in dividend payments, their forecasts should be more accurate, and as a result, more useful to investors than extrapolative dividend estimates.
Consistent with this prediction, we find that analyst dividend forecasts are statistically and economically more accurate compared to five time-series dividend forecasts based on time-series models, particularly in countries with more variable dividend policies. To illustrate, (i) analyst dividend forecasts are on average 45.8% more accurate than martingale estimates-the most commonly used time-series dividend forecast, and (ii) the average difference in accuracy of analyst vs. martingale estimates increases 4.6 times in magnitude as we move from the bottom to the top quartile of countries split by the frequency of changes in dividend payments. Further, we
show that only analyst dividend forecasts, not time-series forecasts, capture market dividend expectations. In other words, investors use analyst dividend forecasts to build expectations of future dividends, which confirms that investors' dividend expectations align with those of analysts. These results are consistent with investors demanding analyst dividend forecasts because they are more accurate than estimates based on public data that are unable to capture variability of dividend policies.
Analysts could produce more accurate estimates compared to time-series models because they have other sources of dividend information, such as management dividend guidance, or dividend forecasting skill. If analysts follow public guidance, all dividend forecasts would exhibit similar accuracy. However, if some analysts have dividend forecasting skill, they will produce differentially more accurate dividend estimates, which is what we find. Overall, the first part of our analysis demonstrates that variability in dividend payments across stocks increases investor demand for dividend information, and analysts respond to this demand by routinely producing dividend forecasts that are more accurate and better capture market dividend expectations than extrapolative dividend estimates, which reflects analysts' dividend forecasting skill.
After highlighting the differential accuracy of analysts' dividend forecasts, the main part of the study examines whether dividend forecasts convey valuable new information. Accurate dividend forecasts are irrelevant unless they convey new information to investors. First, we show that dividend forecast announcements have a significant price impact, even after controlling for contemporaneous announcements of earnings forecasts, stock recommendations and target prices.
A one standard deviation revision in a dividend forecast is associated with a 65.7% increase in the price response around the forecast announcement, which is both statistically and economically significant.
Additionally, a primary argument for the importance of dividends is their signaling value for management's confidence in future earnings and cash flows (Miller and Rock (1985) ).
Dividend signaling models suggest that firms increase dividends when they expect higher future earnings (Bhattacharya (1979) , John and Williams (1985) , Ofer and Thakor (1987) et al. (2015) ) and variability in dividend payouts (Vieira (2011 ), Floyd et al. (2014 ).
companies that disappoint dividend expectations are punished.
[…] Unlike earnings, which are subject to accounting tricks, a dividend cheque is solid. And investors no longer trust managements to invest surplus cash wisely, preferring 'dividend discipline.' (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4cd6cb8c-48e0-11e1-974a-00144feabdc0.html). Further, early research on dividends also discusses the corroborative effect of dividend and earnings expectations (e.g., Aharony and Swary (1980) , Kane et al. (1984) , Easton (1991) to dividend estimates based on time-series models (e.g., Brav et al. (2005) ). Our study provides evidence in support of both assumptions.
I. DATA
We [Insert Figure 1 around here]
We collect share price information from CRSP for US firms and Compustat Global Security Daily file for international firms. We use share price information to scale forecast errors when comparing accuracy of analyst and time-series dividend forecasts. We exclude firms where the default reporting currency is different from the currency in which the stock trades to ensure our comparisons, e.g. of forecasts accuracy across countries, are on a consistent basis. Our final sample includes 651,796 dividend forecasts for 12,135 firms issued by 19,427 analysts employed by 890 brokers. Table 1 document that dividend forecasts are available for a substantial number of dividend issuing firms. As the availability of forecasts on I/B/E/S likely proxies for investor demand for such estimates (DeFond and Hung (2003), Givoly et al. (2009)), the increasing availability of dividend estimates suggests significant investor demand for these estimates.
[Insert Table 1 around here]
II. Empirical results on why analysts produce dividend forecasts
The common assumption in the accounting and finance literature is that dividends are sticky, which would be associated with low demand for analyst dividend forecasts, because investors could easily construct dividend expectations based on recent dividends. To provide evidence on why analysts provide dividend estimates, this section first documents the variability of dividend policies across our sample countries. High variability in dividend payments across stocks should increase investor demand for dividend forecasts. Further, if analyst dividend forecasts are more accurate than alternative estimates, investors can improve their portfolio allocation decisions by relying on analysts' forecasts. Thus, we compare the accuracy of analyst dividend forecasts to the accuracy of dividend estimates from common extrapolative time-series models. Finally, we also examine if analyst dividend forecasts better capture investor dividend expectations than time-series estimates by relating unexpected dividends proxied by dividend forecast errors to stock returns.
We first provide distributional evidence on annual changes in dividend-per-share and the payout ratio. Figure 2a reports the proportion of firms (i) increasing or reducing dividends compared to the prior year and (ii) maintaining the same dividend as in the previous year. Across sample countries, an average of 54% of firms increase dividends, 21% reduce dividends and 25%
maintain dividends compared to the prior year. 10 In the US, 62% of firms increase dividends compared to the prior year and 11% of firms reduce their dividends. Figure 2a is consistent with past studies, such as Vieira (2011), who reports that 66% of French firms and 81% of UK firms increased dividends each year over the period 1994-2004.
Figure_2b reports the fraction of dividend payers across countries that increase, maintain and reduce their annual dividend payout ratio compared to the previous fiscal year, and the trends are similar to those in Figure 2a . The dividend payout ratio increases for 49% of firms and remains constant for only 9% of firm-years. Overall, Figure 2 suggests that dividends are not sticky, especially in recent years, which should increase investor demand for explicit dividend forecasts.
[Insert Figure 2 around here]
A. The accuracy of analyst dividend forecasts compared to time-series dividend estimates
High variability in dividend payments across stocks increases investor demand for dividend information, and analysts respond to this demand by producing dividend forecasts. As analysts should be better at predicting changes in dividend payments, their forecasts should be more accurate compared to estimates from other sources, a proposition we test next. To compare the accuracy of analyst dividend forecasts to that of common time-series dividend estimates, we first calculate the dividend forecast error, FDPS error, which is the absolute difference between the actual dividend, ActualDPS, and the forecasted dividend, FDPS, which we scale by the stock price at the end of the previous fiscal year, P:
.
ActualDPS FDPS FDPS error P
This construct is analogous to standard measure of EPS forecast accuracy (Das et al. (1998) ,
Hope (2003), Richardson et al. (2004) ). In unreported results, we compare the average error and bias of analyst dividend forecasts to that of the contemporaneously issued EPS estimates. 11 The mean dividend forecast error is 63% lower compared to the mean EPS forecast error of 2.06%, and mean dividend forecast bias is 89% smaller compared to the mean EPS forecast bias of −0.60%. Further, the correlation coefficient between errors in analyst dividend and earnings forecasts is 0.35, which suggests that dividend forecasts are unlikely to merely reflect payout-ratio-adjusted EPS forecasts.
[Insert Table 2 around here]
Next, we compare the accuracy of analysts' dividend forecasts to the accuracy of mechanical dividend estimates based on common time-series approaches. If analyst dividend forecasts reflect simple transformations of historic data, we should find no significant differences between the accuracy of analyst forecasts and that of time-series estimates, but we expect to find that analysts respond to demand for dividends by providing more accurate forecasts.
We use five time-series dividend forecasts that are common in the literature (Shevlin (1982) , Yoon and Starks (1995) , Liu et al. (2002) , Botosan and Plumlee (2005)). First, we consider a martingale dividend forecast where the next year dividend equals the past dividend (Naïve DPS 1). Second, we forecast the dividend as the product of the mean payout ratio calculated over the previous seven years and net income for the previous fiscal year (Naïve DPS 2 
where   T ck , and εt is the new error term. We estimate model (3) for each firm using data from the preceding seven years. The third time-series dividend forecast is the product of the target payout ratio estimated from the coefficients in equation ( (Naïve
DPS 5).
For each time-series dividend forecast, we calculate the respective forecast error, Naïve DPS error, which is the absolute difference between the actual dividend and the time-series dividend forecast scaled by the stock price at the end of the previous fiscal year,
The minimum number of years we use to calculate the mean payout ratio is four. 13 Equation (2) is likely to contain a unit root, which would not allow estimation. Table 3 reports the mean difference between the error in analyst dividend forecasts and the error of time-series dividend forecasts described above, i.e. FDPS error − Naïve DPS error.
In all instances, analyst dividend forecasts are more accurate than any of the time-series dividend estimates. Martingale forecasts are closest in accuracy to that of analyst estimates with the mean difference in errors equal to −0.75% (of share price). The least accurate are forecasts based on the target payout ratio and net income for the previous fiscal year. 14 In unreported results, we also find that (i) using median differences in forecasts errors, analyst dividend forecasts are more accurate compared to time-series forecasts in each country, (ii) analyst dividend forecasts are more accurate compared to estimates from the five time-series models for subperiods (fiscal years 2000-2005 and 2006-2010) and (iii) analysts produce more accurate dividend estimates for both increases and reductions in dividends per share. Together, the evidence in Table 3 shows that analysts' dividend forecasts are clearly superior to those from time-series models, inconsistent with some evidence on analysts' earnings forecasts (e.g., Bradshaw et al. (2012)).
To provide economic interpretation of Shevlin (1982) also finds that the martingale dividend forecasts exhibit lower error compared to the Lintner model in predicting dividends for Australian firms. 15 Our results in Table 3 may capture instances where firms stop or initiate dividend payments, which can negatively affect the observed accuracy of dividend forecasts from time-series models. To address this concern, in unreported results, we find that analysts consistently and significantly outperform the five time-series dividend estimates for firms with continuous dividend payments over the past ten years. Moreover, we find that analysts' dividend forecasts issued in the first quarter of the fiscal year are more accurate than any of the five time-series estimates. This result suggests that conclusions in Table 3 are not driven by more accurate forecasts issued close to the fiscal year-end. Finally, it is unlikely that Table 3 results are due to dividend guidance, because dividend guidance is extremely rare. For example, assuming dividend guidance is captured well on I/B/E/S, less than ten firms per year provided dividend guidance in the UK and Japan over the period 2006-2013 (the period during which dividend guidance is available on [Insert Table 3 around here] Figure 2 indicates that dividends are not sticky when examined over a recent sample period, and Table 3 shows that analyst dividend forecasts are more accurate than estimates from time-series models. Next, we link the two analyses and examine the difference in errors of analyst and martingale dividend estimates when sorting countries by the frequency of changes in dividend payments (i.e. the frequency of increases or reductions in annual dividends). Splitting the 16 countries into quartiles, the average difference in accuracy of analyst vs. martingale estimates increases 4.6 times in magnitude as we move from the bottom quartile (−0.3%) to the top quartile (−1.41%) of changes in dividend payments (results untabulated). Further, there is a significant negative correlation of −0.52 between the proportion of firms altering dividends in a country and the difference in errors of analyst vs. martingale dividend forecasts. Thus, variation in actual dividends across years seems to strongly explain why analyst dividend forecasts are more accurate compared to time-series estimates.
B. Analyst dividend forecasts as a surrogate for market dividend expectations
Previous studies document that analysts' earnings forecasts are a better surrogate for investors' unobservable expectation of earnings than are time-series earnings forecasts (Fried and Givoly (1982) , Brown et al. (1987) ). We examine a parallel analysis of whether analysts' dividend forecasts better approximate unobserved market dividend expectations than time-series dividend estimates. For this test, we relate unexpected dividends (measured as analysts' dividend forecast errors) to long window abnormal returns. The regression controls for unexpected earnings to gauge the incremental association between abnormal returns and unexpected dividends for fiscal year t:
where CAR_11 is the 11-month market-adjusted return calculated starting at the end of the first quarter of the fiscal year t. is the mean signed forecast I/B/E/S). In continental Europe, Australia and Hong Kong less than four firms per year provide dividend guidance. 16 By starting with the fourth month after the end of fiscal year t−1, we exclude the effect of the earnings announcement for the previous year. We use 11-month CARs because the average lag between the fiscal year-end error of analyst dividend estimates available at the end of the first fiscal quarter. To test whether analyst dividend forecasts better capture unobserved market expectations, we also include the unexpected dividend from time-series dividend forecasts, ActualDPS Naïve DPS signed Naïve DPS error P   . If analyst dividend forecasts are better surrogates for investor dividend expectations than time-series estimates, the coefficient δ1 should be positive and significant and the coefficient δ2 should be indistinguishable from zero.
is unexpected earnings for fiscal year t calculated using analyst EPS forecasts available at the end of the first fiscal quarter. Table 4 reports regression results for equation (4) Table 4 suggest that investors rely on analyst dividend forecasts, not time-series dividend estimates, to form dividend expectations.
[Insert Table 4 around here]
C. Analyst forecasting skill and accuracy of dividend forecasts
The evidence that dividend forecasts are on average more accurate than time-series estimates suggests that either (i) analysts have other sources of dividend information, such as management dividend guidance, and the marginal cost of producing a dividend forecast from the public signal is close to zero or (ii) analysts have expertise to produce dividend forecasts more accurate than time-series forecasts. To distinguish between the two explanations, this section examines within firm-year differences in accuracy of analyst dividend forecasts; more skillful and the earnings announcement is between 37 and 42.5 days over the period 2001 -2006 (Krishnan and Yang (2009 ). However, the results are qualitatively the same when we use 12-month CARs.
analysts should produce relatively more accurate dividend estimates compared to other analysts following the same firm.
To examine forecasting skill, we relate dividend forecast errors to analyst and broker characteristics. Significant associations suggest that some analysts have skill to improve precision of their dividend estimates compared to the average analyst. To avoid confounding effects affecting our conclusions, we calculate the proportional mean absolute dividend forecast error, PMDPS error, which captures the deviations in accuracy of individual dividend forecasts relative to the mean error of all dividend estimates issued for a firm in a year, FDPS error , i.e.:
FDPS error FDPS error PMDPS error FDPS error
PMDPS_error adjusts for observed and unobserved firm and country characteristics that could affect correlations among dividend forecast errors and analyst and broker characteristics. Lower values of PMDPS_error suggest that some analysts produce more accurate dividend forecasts compared to the average accuracy of dividend forecasts issued for a firm during a year.
D. Analyst and broker characteristics that predict variation in accuracy of dividend forecasts
To identify which analysts produce more accurate dividend forecasts, we regress
PMDPS_error on a set of analyst and broker characteristics that previous studies associate with analyst forecasting skill. These are defined as in Clement (1999), Clement et al. (2003) , Jacob et al. (1999) and Sinha et al. (1997) and include  Analyst general-, industry-, and firm-specific forecasting experience (gen exp, ind exp and firm exp, respectively);  Number of firms an analyst follows, which captures the analyst's workload (#firms followed);  Frequency of dividend and EPS forecasts revisions (freq_rev);  Number of analysts employed by a broker (broker size), which reflects the amount of resources available to analysts; and  Forecast horizon (horizon), which is the number of days between the dividend forecast announcement and the respective fiscal year-end. 
where the prefix 'D' indicates a demeaned value. A positive beta coefficient indicates that a higher value of an analyst or broker characteristic reduces dividend forecast accuracy.
E. Empirical evidence on whether analysts have skill to produce accurate dividend estimates
Panel A of Table 5 reports mean values of analyst, broker, and country characteristics from equation (6) before subtracting corresponding firm-year means. The average analyst in the sample has seven years of general forecasting experience, six years of industry-specific experience, and three years of firm-specific experience. On average analysts follow approximately twelve firms, with analysts in Denmark following the fewest firms, likely a result of a relatively small domestic equity market in Denmark. Analysts in the US and Japan follow the largest number of firms. The average frequency of revisions in analyst EPS and dividend forecasts is 13 days, which is consistent with the weekly data collection process by I/B/E/S. 18 An average broker employs around 91 analysts, and an average dividend forecast is issued close to mid-fiscal year. The mean EPS forecast error is 2.06%, comparable with prior research (Hope 17 Our conclusions remain qualitatively the same when we use unwinsorized variables. Analyst and broker characteristics are constructed using the I/B/E/S detail dividend and EPS files starting from January 1995, which avoids eliminating observations in the early sample period to construct explanatory variables and produces more reliable measures (Clement (1999) [Insert Table 5 around here] Panel B of Table 5 reports regressions results for equation (6). We find that analysts with higher firm-specific forecasting experience, who revise their forecasts less frequently and produce more accurate EPS forecasts, and who follow a larger number of stocks produce relatively more accurate dividend forecasts. The evidence in Table 5 confirms that (i) some analysts have skill to produce more accurate dividend estimates and (ii) analysts' skill to forecast dividends accurately is not a mechanical extension of earnings forecasts ability. Importantly, because we use a relative accuracy measure, the evidence that some analysts issue more accurate dividend estimates cannot be attributed to management dividend guidance. Simply following management guidance would yield equally accurate dividend forecasts across all analysts following a firm.
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III. The usefulness of dividend forecasts to investors
The results presented so far are consistent with investors demanding analyst dividend forecasts because these forecasts are more accurate than estimates based on public data, which perform poorly due to within-firm variability of dividends. However, even the most accurate dividend forecasts may be unimportant to investors if dividend forecasts do not convey valuable new information to the market. To address this concern, we conduct short-window tests to examine whether (i) dividend forecasts have incremental information content compared to other common analyst research outputs and (ii) investors use analyst dividend forecasts in assessing quality of earnings news. 19 In unreported results, our conclusion that more skilled analysts issue more accurate dividend forecasts is unchanged when (i) we estimate equation (6) using annual Fama MacBeth regressions, (ii) we repeat the analysis from Table 5 after removing dividend forecasts for US stocks, or (iii) we repeat the analysis from Table 5 only for dividend forecasts for US stocks. Because equation (6) uses variables adjusted for firm-year means, standard errors do not need to control for firm or year effects. Consistent with this claim, in unreported results, we find that using standard errors clustered on both analyst and year has no effect on the magnitude of p-values. Further, to exclude the possibility that Table 5 results are due to private access to management by some analysts, we estimate equation (6) using a sample of dividend forecasts for US firms issued after the introduction of regulation Fair Disclosure, and for European firms after the implementation of Council Directive 2003/6/EC. The conclusions from this subsample are qualitatively similar to that from Table 5 . 
A. The information content of analyst dividend forecasts
We expect the coefficient α 1 to be positive if dividend forecasts have incremental information content. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% level. We use the US and international versions of the broker translation file to match broker names between the target price and EPS files.
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Panel A of Table 6 [Insert Table 6 around here]
A concern with the returns analysis in Panel A is that the price reaction patterns to positive and negative dividend revisions may simply reflect reactions to other concurrently issued forecasts. To test for an incremental price effect of dividend revisions, Panel B of Table 6 reports 20 For US stocks, we use the CRSP value-weighted index as the benchmark to measure abnormal returns when calculating CAR. For non-US stocks, we use the main index of the exchange where the firm's stock lists. We scale revisions in analyst dividend, earnings and target prices by the stock price at the end of the previous fiscal year to ensure revisions are comparable across stocks. Similarly to Keung (2010), we assume that analysts reiterate their EPS, target prices and stock recommendations if dividend forecasts are issued without a revision to an EPS, a target price or a stock recommendation. We require that the consecutive forecasts we use to calculate revisions are no more than 300 days apart, which eliminates infrequently revised forecasts. Our final sample includes 227,336 dividend revisions. 21 The broker translation file is from 2005, which eliminates broker houses covered by I/B/E/S after that date. We lose 9.6% of target price forecasts due to this limitation.
regression results for equation (7). Column 1 reports results for equation (7) when we include only revisions in analyst EPS and dividend forecasts. Controlling for concurrent EPS revisions, we document a significant price reaction to dividend forecast revisions. The significant association between dividend revisions and announcement date returns persists when we control for concurrent recommendation revisions in column 2, and when we use the full specification of equation (7) in column 3. Using the full specification of model (7), we find that a one standard deviation increase in ΔFDPS leads to a 65.7% higher price change around the forecast announcement (relative to the average price reaction level), a significant economic price impact of dividend forecasts revisions. 22 Together, the results in Table 6 confirm that dividend estimates convey valuable new information to the market.
B. The usefulness of analyst dividend forecasts in assessing earnings surprises
This section examines if investors use analyst dividend forecasts in assessing quality of firm reported earnings, and provides an additional illustration on the usefulness of analyst dividend forecasts to investors. Dividend signaling models (Bhattacharya (1979), John and
Williams (1985), Ofer and Thakor (1987) , Skinner and Soltes (2011) ) suggest that firms increase dividends when they expect higher future earnings. Thus, positive earnings surprises that are accompanied by positive dividend surprises should indicate more sustainable earnings than positive earnings news absent positive dividend news, and vice versa.
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In the first step, to enable across-metric comparisons, we recalculate earnings and dividend surprises. Similar to prior research (e.g. Ertimur et al. (2003)), earnings surprise (SUE)
is the price-scaled difference between the actual EPS and the mean analyst EPS forecast available at the end of the last quarter of a fiscal year. Similarly, a dividend surprise based on analyst forecasts (SUD) is calculated as the mean signed forecast error of all analyst dividend estimates 22 The economic magnitude of the price impact for dividend revisions is calculated as the coefficient estimate*standard deviation of ΔFDPS/mean CAR. 23 The dividend surprise helps interpret the earnings surprise because dividend changes are more persistent than earnings changes (Lintner (1956), Marsh and Merton (1987) , Allen et al. (2000), Skinner and Soltes (2011), Caskey and Hanlon (2013) ). Ertimur et al. (2003) show that investors attach more weight to more persistent signals about firm earnings, thus positive earnings news accompanied by positive dividend news produces a stronger positive signal of firm value than if the sign of dividend news differs from that of unexpected earnings. Dividend forecasts can be useful in assessing quality of reported earnings because dividend announcements almost always coincide with preliminary earnings announcements (99% of cases in our sample). I/B/E/S actuals files provide dates for dividend and preliminary earnings announcements.
reported in the last quarter of a fiscal year. SUE and SUD capture the unexpected earnings and dividend news revealed at the joint preliminary earnings and dividend announcements. We then use a regression model to relate dividend and earnings surprises to three-day cumulative abnormal returns centered on the joint preliminary earnings and dividend announcements, CAR_Earn:
Based on predictions of dividend signaling models, we expect a positive coefficient ψ1 as higher dividend surprises anticipate higher future earnings; the coefficient ψ3 should be positive if investors use dividends in interpreting earnings news. Consistent with prior research (Ball and Brown (1968) , Chari et al. (1988) , Easton and Zmijewski (1989) , Gennotte and Truemann (1996) ), we expect a positive earnings response coefficient ψ2.
If dividend surprises are on average zero, equation (8) will have low power to detect whether investors use analyst-based dividend surprises to interpret earnings news. However, Figure 3 shows that this concern is not warranted. On average, firms beat analyst dividend forecasts in 42% of cases, which suggests that a significant proportion of firms surprise the market. Only 18% of firms across sample countries exactly meet analysts' dividend forecasts.
Thus, dividend surprises can convey useful information in interpreting earnings news.
[Insert Figure 3 around here]
Panel A of Table 7 reports results for equation (8). The coefficient on dividend surprises is positive, and the R 2 doubles when dividend surprises are added to the univariate model that includes only earnings surprises. The economic impact of dividend news is considerable: a one standard deviation increase in SUD leads to a 92% higher price change around the preliminary earnings announcements (relative to the average price reaction level). For comparison, a one standard deviation increase in SUE leads to an 85% higher price change (relative to the average price reaction level). This result suggests that investors react more strongly to dividend than earnings news, which is consistent with higher persistence of the former. The coefficient on the interaction term is positive, consistent with investors benchmarking reported earnings against analyst-based dividends expectations.
24 24 In unreported results, we also include a measure of operating cash flow surprise defined in a similar way to SUE in equation (8). We include the cash flow surprise because dividend surprises can proxy for operating cash flow news. The coefficient on the cash flow surprise is not significant, consistent with results in Givoly et al. (2009) 
The last columns of Panel A report results for Eq. (9) and Panel B tests equality of coefficients. Consistent with the dividend signal hypothesis, investors react more strongly when the firm reports both positive or zero earnings and dividend news than when the firm meets or beats earnings expectations, but the dividend surprise is negative, i.e. θ1 > θ2. Further, negative price reaction to disappointing earnings news is moderated when accompanied by positive or zero dividend news, i.e. θ3 > θ4. Together, Table 7 results are consistent with investors using dividend surprises to condition their interpretation of earnings news.
that cash flow forecasts have no incremental information content beyond that provided by end-of-year earnings forecasts. We continue to find positive coefficients on SUE and SUD and the interaction term, and conclude that dividend surprises do not proxy for cash flow news. Further, we find that our conclusions from Eq. (8) remain qualitatively the same if we scale earnings and dividend surprises by the standard deviation of analyst earnings and dividend forecasts, respectively. We do not report these results as to calculate the two surprise measures requires at min. three forecasts and non-zero dispersion, which substantially reduces the number of observations.
C. Analyst dividend forecasts and future earnings growth and positive earnings surprises
To corroborate the conclusion that investors use dividend surprises to interpret earnings news, we also examine the likelihood of next period ( 
The model predicting next period earnings growth is similar to equation (10) Lawson and Wang (2015) , who document that auditors charge lower 25 We use I/B/E/S actual EPS which is adjusted for changes in the number of shares. 26 The coefficient on SUE + SUD − in the model predicting earnings growth is consistent with the Ohlson (1995) model, where next period EPS reduce with the current period dividend, which in return lowers the likelihood of growth in earnings. 27 Our results in Sections 2 and 3 suggest that analysts respond to investor demand for dividend forecasts. Analysts have strong incentives to do so. First, the Institutional Investor All-American rankings depend on the price-impact magnitude of analyst research and depth of coverage (Stickel (1992) , Leone and Wu (2007) ). Thus, dividend forecasts and their revisions (which we show associate with significant price changes) are more likely to garner investor attention and lead to a better ranking. Second, Maber et al. (2014) examine how institutional investors reward sell-side analyst research through broker votes. They document that analysts can gain broker votes by providing timely and actionable investment information, which can include accurate dividend forecasts. Both AllAmerican ranking and broker votes directly affect analysts compensation and career outcomes (Hong et al. (2000) , Hong and Kubik (2003) , Groysberg et al. (2011 ), Brown et al. (2015 ).
fees to dividend-paying clients. They argue that this result is consistent with dividends reducing audit risk by enhancing clients' earnings quality information, which our results also demonstrate.
IV. Conclusion
This study documents that analysts routinely produce dividend forecasts. Analysts supply dividend estimates in response to investor demand, which is driven by high variability in dividend payments across stocks. Further, we document that (i) analyst dividend forecasts are more accurate and better approximate market dividend expectations than time-series dividend forecasts or payout-adjusted earnings, (ii) dividend forecasts have incremental information beyond that contained in earnings, target prices and stock recommendations and (iii) investors use analyst dividend forecasts in assessing quality of earnings news. In contrast to the disappearing dividends view in accounting and finance research, our results suggest an increasing emphasis on dividend forecasts, as suggested by increasing coverage, and that analysts' dividend forecast are an overlooked but important component of the overall pricing in capital markets. Fig.2a reports the fraction of dividend payers across countries that increase, maintain and reduce their annual dividend-per-share (DPS) compared to the previous fiscal year. Reported actual DPS are from I/B/E/S and are adjusted for changes in the number of shares. If I/B/E/S dividend is missing, we use Compustat and Compustat Global dividend information and I/B/E/S number of shares outstanding. Fig.2b reports the fraction of dividend payers across countries that increase, maintain and reduce their annual dividend payout ratio compared to the previous fiscal year. Table III The difference between the accuracy of analyst dividend forecasts and naïve dividend estimates
The table reports the difference between the accuracy of analyst dividend forecasts and the accuracy of naïve dividend estimates. The diff column reports the mean difference between the error in analyst dividend forecasts and the error of naïve dividend forecasts, i.e. (FDPS error − Naïve DPS error), where FDPS error is the absolute difference between the actual and the forecasted dividend scaled by the stock price at the end of the previous fiscal year, and Naïve DPS error is the absolute difference between the actual dividend and the naïve dividend forecast scaled by the stock price at the end of the previous fiscal year. p is the p-value for a two-tailed t-test of the hypothesis that the average difference in forecast errors is zero. Naïve DPS 1 is the martingale dividend forecast where the next year dividend equals the previous year dividend. Naïve DPS 2 is the dividend forecast calculated as the product of the mean payout ratio for a firm calculated over the previous seven years and the net income for the previous fiscal year. Naïve DPS 3 is the product of the target payout ratio from Eq. (3) and net income for the previous fiscal year. Naïve DPS 4 is the product of the target payout ratio from Eq. (3) and the analyst EPS forecast. Naïve DPS 5
is the past dividend plus the predicted dividend change from Eq. (3).
̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅ ï 1 ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅ −1 is the percentage difference between the (country-level) mean analyst dividend forecast error, ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅ , and the mean error of martingale dividend forecasts, ï 1 ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅ . The Average row reports the averages.
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